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Abstract. We analyze the bidding behavior of expectations-based loss-averse bidders in
auctions with interdependent values. We emphasize the difference between the risk
bidders face over whether they win the auction (extensive risk) and the risk they face over
the value of the prize conditional on winning (intensive risk). The extensive risk creates an
“attachment” effect, whereas the intensive risk operates via a “comparison” effect. How
loss-averse bidders react to these different risks depends on whether they incorporate their
bid into their reference point. Under “unacclimating personal equilibrium” (UPE), where
bidders keep their expectations fixed when choosing their bids, both the extensive and
intensive risks induce them to bidmore aggressively. Moreover, bidders are exposed to the
“winner’s curse” and a seller can attain higher revenue by hiding information in order to
leverage the intensive risk. By contrast, under “choice-acclimating personal equilibrium”
(CPE), where a bid determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery, the
intensive risk creates a “precautionary bidding” effect that pushes bidders to behave less
aggressively; whether this effect is reinforced or undermined by the extensive risk depends
on a bidder’s likelihood of winning the auction. Furthermore, bidders are less aggressive
than under UPE and can be subject to a “loser’s curse.” Yet, by committing to bidding less
aggressively, such as by engaging in proxy bidding, loss-averse bidders are better off
under CPE than UPE.
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I hate to lose more than I love to win.—Jimmy Connors
1. Introduction
In many auctions, the value of the good for sale is
subject to ex post risk, and bidders will learn its true
value only after the auction is over. A preeminent
example of such auctions is the so-called common-
value auction, where bidders share the same value for
the good up for sale, but at the time of the auction,
each bidder is only partially informed about this
value. More generally, bidders’ valuations are often
interdependent, as a bidder’s value also depends on
other bidders’ private information. This is the case, for
instance, in auctions for wine, antiques, artworks, or
real estate. For all of these goods, their future resale
value, authenticity, or quality cannot be perfectly
known at the time of sale, and so they are stochastic
from the buyers’ point of view. Therefore, in these
auctions, bidders’ attitudes toward risk play a crucial
role in determining their bidding strategies and, in
turn, the auction’s performance in terms of revenue.
In this paper, we analyze first-price auctions (FPAs)
and second-price auctions (SPA) in which bidders
have interdependent values and are expectations-
based loss-averse, à la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006).
For each auction format, we derive the unique sym-
metric equilibrium and characterize the impact of loss
aversion on bidding, highlighting how the equilib-
rium strategy of loss-averse bidders differs from that
of risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders. Moreover, we
show that revenue equivalence between the FPA and
the SPA might fail even when bidders have inde-
pendent signals about the good’s unknown value.
In auctionswith interdependent values, bidders are
exposed to twokindsof risk. First, there is theuncertainty
regarding losing and winning the auction. We call this
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risk, which stems from the uncertainty about whether a
bidder submitted the highest bid, the “extensive risk.”
Second, different from the case of private values,
uncertainty does not fully resolve for the winner
because the value of the good is unknown ex ante and
is affected by the information held by the other bid-
ders; moreover, depending on the auction format, a
winning bidder is also exposed to uncertainty over
the price to pay. We call this risk, to which a bidder is
exposed even conditional on the fact that he or she
submitted the highest bid, the “intensive risk.” Table 1
summarizes the different types of risk that arise in
private-value and interdependent-value auctions,
depending on the auction format. The SPA always
entails intensive risk in the payment for both private
and interdependent values; yet, if values are inter-
dependent, both the SPA and FPA expose bidders to
additional intensive risk in consumption.
While both the extensive and intensive risk in money
unambiguously lower equilibrium bids, in the con-
sumption dimension, the effect of these two risks de-
pends on the extent to which loss-averse bidders in-
corporate their bid into their referencepoint.Weconsider
twoalternative formulations introducedbyKőszegi and
Rabin (2007). In a “choice-acclimating personal equi-
librium” (CPE), bidders choose the strategy that maxi-
mizes their expected payoff given that the strategy de-
termines both the distribution of the reference point and
the distribution of outcomes; hence, when contemplating
whether to deviate from their equilibrium bid, bidders
adjust their reference point accordingly. In an “unac-
climatingpersonal equilibrium” (UPE), instead, bidders
choose the strategy that maximizes their expected payoff
conditional on expectations, and the distribution of out-
comes so generated must coincide with the expectations;
hence,when contemplatingwhether to deviate from their
equilibrium bid, bidders hold their reference point fixed.1
Both specifications are sensible from a theoretical
perspective and have been applied in various economic
settings. We refrain from taking a stand on which spec-
ification is more appropriate but point out that the two
yield very different predictions in terms of bidders’ be-
havior and welfare. Under UPE, both the intensive and
extensive risks in consumption push bidders to bidmore
aggressively.UnderCPE, instead, theintensiveriskpushes
bidders to bid less aggressively; whether this effect is
reinforced or undermined by the extensive risk depends
on a bidder’s likelihood of winning the auction.
Section 2 introduces bidders’ preferences and so-
lution concepts. We analyze an environment with
interdependent values that encompasses pure private
and pure common values as special cases and in
which bidders receive independent private signals.
This formulation preserves revenue equivalence un-
der risk neutrality; hence, in our model, any differ-
ence in the expected revenue between auction formats
is driven by bidders’ preferences and not by corre-
lation in bidders’ signals or values. FollowingKőszegi
andRabin (2006),we posit that, in addition to classical
material utility, bidders also experience “gain–loss
utility”when comparing their material outcomes to a
reference point equal to their expectations regarding
the same outcomes, with losses being more painful
than equal-sized gains are pleasant. We focus on
symmetric equilibria in increasing strategies; thus,
the bidder with the highest signal wins the auction.
Section 3 analyzes the FPA and SPA under UPE. In
both formats, the extensive risk in consumption creates
an “attachment” effect that pushes loss-averse bid-
ders to bidmore aggressively comparedwith the risk-
neutral benchmark. Indeed, because bidders treat
their reference point as fixed when choosing their
bids, they are willing to pay more in order to win the
auction and reduce the chances of experiencing a loss.
Furthermore, the intensive risk over the value of the
good creates a “comparison” effect that also pushes
bidders to bid more aggressively. Intuitively, in a sym-
metric equilibrium, winning with a high bid makes it
more likely that a high-value goodwill be obtained; this,
in turn, pushes bidders to bid more in order to reduce
the likelihood of experiencing a loss in the event that the
realized value of the good falls short of their expecta-
tions. Notice that this comparison effect does not arise
in private-value auctions where the value of the object
is perfectly known in advance. Thus, under UPE, the
uncertainty in the good’s value makes loss-averse
bidders worse off compared with a comparable en-
vironment with private values; this is in stark contrast
to the result by Eső and White (2004) that bidders
displaying decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
are made better off by the uncertainty in the good’s
value. Therefore, an implication of our model is that,
under UPE, a revenue-maximizing seller facing loss-
averse bidders has a strong incentive to purposely
introduce risk into their values.2 Moreover, as both
the extensive and the intensive risks induce bidders to
Table 1. Extensive and Intensive Risk with Private and Interdependent Values
Private values Interdependent values
Consumption Money Consumption Money
FPA Extensive risk Extensive risk Extensive + intensive risk Extensive risk
SPA Extensive risk Extensive + intensive risk Extensive + intensive risk Extensive + intensive risk
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bid rather aggressively, expectations-based loss aver-
sion also provides a novel explanation for the “winner’s
curse” often observed in interdependent-value auctions.3
Our explanation for the winner’s curse, however,
differs from traditional ones based on limited rational-
ity, whereby bidders fail to realize that, conditional on
winning, they have the most optimistic signal. In fact,
loss-averse bidders hold correct expectations about the
good’s value; yet, they bid aggressively in order to
winmore often and against opponents with relatively
high signals, thereby reducing their chances of ex-
periencing a loss. Hence, under UPE, both the extensive
and intensive risks in the consumption dimension
push loss-averse bidders to bid aggressively. Bidding
aggressively, however, also exposes a bidder to losses
in the money dimension. In particular, in the FPA,
raising your bid by $1 leads to a $1 increase in the
expected payment conditional on winning. In the
SPA, instead, raising your bid by $1 leads to a less
than $1 increase in the expected payment conditional
onwinning; yet, in the SPA, a bidder is also exposed to
intensive risk inmoney.We show that, in equilibrium,
the losses in the money dimension implied by raising
one’s bid are the same in both formats; hence, the FPA
and SPA are revenue equivalent under UPE.
Section 4 analyzes the FPA and SPA under CPE. In
both formats, the extensive risk has a “bifurcating”
effect whereby loss-averse bidders with low signals
underbid relative to risk-neutral bidders, whereas those
with high signals might overbid. Hence, in equilibrium,
bidderswith high signalsmight suffer from thewinner’s
curse. By contrast, the intensive risk creates a pre-
cautionary bidding effect—akin to the one identified
by Eső and White (2004) for DARA bidders—that
pushes loss-averse bidders to bid less aggressively.4
Yet, themechanismbehind the precautionary bidding
effect in our model differs from the one in Eső and
White (2004). As DARA bidders prefer to have a higher
income when winning the auction, they reduce their
bids by more than the appropriate risk premium; in
otherwords, DARA bidders are “prudent”; see Kimball
(1990) and Eeckhoudt et al. (1996). Instead, our pre-
cautionary bidding effect under CPE has a first-order
nature in the sense that it does not depend on the
curvature of the utility function. Indeed, as shown by
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2017), loss aversion and CPE
are incompatiblewith prudence.5Moreover, we show
that the FPA fetches a higher expected revenue than
the SPA. The reason is that, under CPE, when raising
their bid, bidders immediately adjust their reference
point (i.e., bidding more aggressively does not lead to
surprise losses in the money dimension). However, in
the SPA, bidders are also exposed to intensive risk in their
monetary outcomes. As loss-averse bidders dislike the
additional intensive risk ingrained in the SPA, they
bid more aggressively in the FPA than in the SPA.
Section 5 compares UPE and CPE from the bidders’
perspective. Although bidders might suffer from the
winner’s curse in both cases, under CPE, ex post a
bidder regrets not bidding more. This happens be-
cause, under CPE, bidders commit in advance to their
bids, and this weakens the attachment effect. Thus,
under CPE, bidders also suffer from a “loser’s curse”
as in Holt and Sherman (1994) and Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997). Yet, by committing to bidding less
aggressively—for instance, by using a bidding proxy—
bidders are better off under CPE than under UPE.
Section 6 compares the behavior of loss-averse bid-
ders with that of risk-averse ones under either DARA or
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). We show that
loss aversion delivers different implications than both.
Indeed, whereas DARA bidders prefer bidding in an
interdependent-value environment rather than in a
(comparable) private-value one, loss-averse bidders attain
the same utility in both environments under CPE, but
they strictly prefer bidding in a private-value environ-
ment under UPE. Moreover, whereas CARA bidders
always bid less aggressively than risk-neutral ones,
loss-averse bidders might bid more aggressively than
risk-neutral ones under both CPE and UPE.
Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs are relegated
to the appendix, whereas the web appendix gathers
extensions omitted from themain text. The remainder
of this section discusses the related literature.
1.1. Literature Review
Next to expected utility, Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979, 1991) has arguably become the most prominent
approach for modeling risk preferences. Together with
probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity,
the central building blocks of prospect theory are ref-
erence dependence and loss aversion. In a series of in-
fluential papers, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009)
developed a model of reference-dependent preferences
and loss aversion where “gain–loss utility” is derived
from standard “consumption utility,” and the refer-
ence point is determined endogenously by rational
expectations. Their model has found many fruitful
applications in different areas of economics, finance,
and decision analysis, including firms’ pricing and
advertising strategies (Heidhues and Kőszegi 2008,
2014; Spiegler 2012; Herweg and Mierendorff 2013;
Karle and Peitz 2014, 2017; Rosato 2016; Karle and
Schumacher 2017), incentives provision (Herweg
et al. 2010, Eliaz and Spiegler 2015, Daido and
Murooka, 2016, Macera 2018), tournaments and con-
tests (Gill and Stone 2010, Gül Mermer 2017, Dato
et al. 2018, Fu et al. 2019), asset pricing (Pagel 2016),
life cycle consumption (Pagel 2017), and bilat-
eral negotiations (Benkert 2017, Rosato 2017, Herweg
et al. 2018). In particular, there have been several studies
on the implications of expectations-based loss aversion
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in auctions. Lange and Ratan (2010) study private-
value auctions under CPE and show that the FPA
outperforms the SPA in terms of revenue. Belica and
Ehrhart (2014) also compare FPA and SPA under both
UPE and CPE (but without loss aversion in money);
like us, they also find more aggressive bidding under
UPE than under CPE. Eisenhuth (2019) shows that
under CPE, the all-pay auction yields the highest
revenue among sealed-bid formats. Ehrhart and Ott
(2017) show that under UPE, the Dutch auction yields
a higher expected revenue than the English auction.
von Wangenheim (2017) compares the English auc-
tion with the second-price one under UPE, showing
that the latter yields a higher expected revenue. Rosato
(2019) studies sequential sealed-bid auctions of multi-
ple objects under CPE and shows that expectations-
based loss aversion can explain the “afternoon effect”—
the puzzling yet robust empirical phenomenonwhereby
prices of identical goods tend to decline between
rounds. Yet, our paper is the first to study the impli-
cations of expectations-based loss aversion in auctions
with interdependent values.
2. The Model
In this section, we introduce the auction environment
and bidders’ preferences, and provide formal defi-
nitions of the solution concepts—CPE and UPE—in
the context of sealed-bid auctions.
2.1. Environment
A seller auctions off an item to N ≥ 2 bidders via a
sealed-bid auction. Each bidder, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, ob-
serves a private signal ti independently and identi-
cally distributed on the support [t, t ], with t ≥ 0 and
t > t, according to the cumulative distribution func-
tion F. We assume that F is continuously differen-
tiable, with strictly positive density f on its support.
Bidder i’s value for the object is Vi  vi(t1, t2, . . . , tN),
where the function vi :RN+ →R+ is increasing in all of
its arguments and is twice continuously differentia-
ble. Moreover, vi is strictly increasing in ti. Notice that
this formulationnests private values (vi(t1, t2, . . . , tN)  ti)
and pure common values (V  v(t1, t2, . . . , tN)) as spe-
cial cases. We focus on symmetric environments. Let
t−i :(t1,...,ti−1,ti+1,...,tN). Then, vi(t1,t2, . . . ,tN) v(ti,t−i),
and the function v, which is the same for all bidders, is
symmetric in its last N − 1 arguments. We consider
two canonical selling mechanisms: the FPA and the
SPA. We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in
increasing strategies and abstract from reserve prices.
2.2. Bidders’ Preferences
Bidders have reference-dependent preferences as for-
mulated by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). Bidder i’s
utility function has two components. First, if they win
the auction at price p, bidders experience consumption
utility Vi − p, which represents the classical notion of
outcome-based utility. Second, bidders also derive
utility from comparing their actual consumption to a
reference consumption outcome given by their recent
expectations (probabilistic beliefs).6 Hence, for a
deterministic outcome (Vi, p) and deterministic ref-





 Vi − p + μg Vi − rV
( )
+ μm rp − p( ) ,
(1)
where
μl x( )  ηlx if x ≥ 0
ηlλlx if x < 0
{
is the gain–loss utility.7 The parameter ηl ≥ 0 captures
the relative weight a consumer attaches to gain–loss
utility, whereas λl > 1 is the coefficient of loss aver-
sion, with l ∈ {m, g}.8 Moreover, according to (1), a
bidder assesses gains and losses separately over each
dimension of consumption utility; this is consistent
with much of the experimental evidence commonly
interpreted in terms of loss aversion.
Because expectations are stochastic in many situ-
ations, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) allow for the ref-
erence point to be a pair of probability distributions,
H  (HV ,Hp), over the two dimensions of consump-
tion utility; then, a bidder’s total utility from the















μm rp−p( )dHp rp( ).
In other words, for each utility dimension, a bidder
compares the realized outcome to all possible out-
comes in the reference lottery, each one weighted by
its probability.
2.3. Solution Concepts
Bidders learn their signal (or type) before bidding and
thus maximize their interim expected utility. If the
distribution of the reference points isH  (HV ,Hp) and
the distribution of consumption outcomes is G 
(GV ,Gp), then the interim expected utility of a bidder
with signal ti is














A strategy of bidder i is a function βi : [t, t ] → R+ .
Fixing all other bidders’ strategies, β−i, the bid of
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bidder iwith type ti, βi(ti), induces a distribution over
the set of final consumption outcomes. Let Γ(βi(ti),β−i)
denote this distribution. In a sealed-bid auction, un-
certainty is resolved after all bids are submitted. As
pointed out by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), when a
person makes a committed decision long before out-
comes occur, that person affects the reference point
with his or her choice so that G ≡ H. This is what
Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) call CPE.
Definition 1. A strategy profile β∗ constitutes a CPE if,
for all i and for all ti,
EU Γ β∗i ti( ),β∗−i
( )|Γ β∗i ti( ) ,β∗−i( ), ti[ ]
≥ EU Γ b,β∗−i
( )|Γ b,β∗−i( ), ti[ ]
for any b ∈ R+.9
In a CPE, if a bidder deviates to a different strategy,
the bidder’s reference point changes accordingly.
However, if a decision is made shortly before out-
comes are realized, the reference point is fixed by past
expectations; in this case, the bidder maximizes his or
her expected utility, taking the reference point as
given. Hence, a bidder can plan to submit a bid only if
this is optimal given the reference point induced by
the expectation to do so. This is what Kőszegi and
Rabin (2007) call UPE.
Definition 2. A strategy profile β∗ constitutes a UPE if,
for all i and for all ti,
EU Γ β∗i ti( ),β∗−i
( )|Γ β∗i ti( ),β∗−i( ), ti[ ]
≥ EU Γ b,β∗−i
( )|Γ β∗i ti( ),β∗−i( ), ti[ ]
for any b ∈ R+.
Therefore, different from CPE, under UPE, if a bidder
deviates to a different strategy, the reference point
does not change. Notice that there might exist mul-
tiple UPEs—that is, multiple plans that the bidder
is willing to follow through. In this case, following
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that
bidders select the UPE that yields the highest ex-
pected utility among all symmetric UPEs; that is,
bidders select their (symmetric) preferred per-
sonal equilibrium (PPE). The following assump-
tion, maintained for the remainder of the paper,
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in in-
creasing strategies.
Assumption 1 (No Dominance of Gain–Loss Utility in the
Item Dimension). Let Λg ≡ ηg(λg − 1) ≤ 1.
For given λg, Assumption 1 places an upper bound
on ηg (and vice versa).10 This bound ensures that a
bidder’s expected utility is increasing in his or her
type by imposing that the weight on gain–loss utility
does not (strictly) exceed the weight on consumption
utility.11 Finally, notice that risk neutrality is embedded
in the model as a special case (for either ηg  ηm  0 or
λg  λm  1).
2.4. An Illustrative Example
We now provide an extended example to illustrate
how the intensive and extensive risks affect the be-
havior of loss-averse bidders under both UPE and
CPE. For simplicity, we focus on the FPA with two
bidders and assume ηm  0—so that bidders are loss-
averse only with respect to consumption but risk
neutral over money. The value of the object for sale is
the same for both bidders and equal to v(ti, t−i)  ti+ t−i,
where ti and t−i represent bidder i’s and his oppo-
nent’s signal, respectively. This structure is known
as the “wallet game” (Klemperer 1998, Bulow and
Klemperer 2002).
We begin by describing the behavior of loss-averse
bidders under UPE. Consider bidder iwith type ti  t,
who planned to bid according to his or her true type
but is contemplating deviating and bid as if his or her
type were t̃ > t. Assume i’s opponent follows the
posited equilibrium strategy β∗I (·), and let F(t̃) denote
the probability that the opponent’s type is lower
than t̃. Similarly, let F(s|t̃) denote the probability that
the opponent’s type is lower than s, conditional on it
being lower than t̃. Then, the expected utility of a
bidder of type t who mimics type t̃ > t is
EU t̃, t
( )  F t̃( ) t + ∫ t̃
t
sdF s|t̃( ) − β∗I t̃( )
[ ]




+ ηgF t̃( ) 1 − F t( )[ ] t + ∫ t̃
t
sdF s|t̃( )[ ]
− Ω̃ t̃, t( ), (2)





t (x− y)dF(y|t)dF(x|t̃)}. The bidder wins the auc-
tion with probability F(t̃); conditional on winning,
the expected value of the good is [t+∫ t̃t sdF(s|t)], and
the payment is β∗I (t̃). Thus, the first term on the right-
hand side of (2) represents the standard expected
material payoff. The other terms represent expected
gain–loss utility and are derived as follows. The first
two terms arise from the extensive risk. Indeed, with
probability F(t̃), the bidder wins the auction; compar-
ing this outcome to the possibility of losing the auc-
tion, which, given his or her reference point, the bidder
expects to happen with probability [1 − F(t)], generates
a gain of ηg[(t+ ∫ t̃t sdF(s|t̃)) − 0]. Similarly, with prob-
ability [1 − F(t̃)], the bidder loses the auction; com-
paring this outcome to the possibility of winning the
Balzer and Rosato: Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–19, © 2020 The Author(s) 5
auction, which, given reference point, the bidder ex-
pects to happen with probability F(t), entails a loss of
ηgλg[0 − (t+∫ tt sdF(s|t))]. Finally, the term Ω̃(t̃, t) arises
from the intensive risk, capturing the feelings of gain
and loss the bidder experiences if he or she wins
the auction, and compares the actual realized value of
the opponent’s signal—and hence of the good—to the
other values that could have been realized.
We now show that both the extensive and intensive
risk create an upward pressure on the equilibrium
bid. Hence, loss-averse bidders bidmore aggressively
than risk-neutral ones. Indeed, in equilibrium, a bidder
of type t prefers to bid β∗I (t) instead of mimicking type
t̃ > t by bidding β∗I (t̃):
EU t,t( )≥EU t̃,t( )
⇔F t̃( )β∗I t̃( )−F t( )β∗I t( )≥ F t̃( )−F t( )[ ]t +∫ t̃
t
sdF s( )








+Ω t,t( )−Ω t̃,t( )⏟̅̅̅̅̅⏞⏞̅̅̅̅̅⏟
>0
. (3)
The left-hand side of (3) represents the material cost
for a type-t bidder to mimic a higher type: a higher
expected payment. The right-hand side of (3) repre-
sents the bidder’s benefits from mimicking a higher
type. The terms on the first line capture the standard
material benefits: a higher chance of winning the auction
andwinning against an opponent with a higher signal.
The other terms stem from loss aversion. The first two
capture gain–loss utility associated with a change in
the extensive risk. Indeed, for a fixed reference point,
bidding more aggressively increases the likelihood of
realizing a gain and reduces the likelihood of expe-
riencing a loss. This creates an attachment effect that
pushes loss-averse bidders to bid more aggressively
than risk-neutral ones. Finally, the last term on the
right-hand side of (3) captures the gain–loss utility
associated with a change in the intensive risk. This
term is also positive, capturing a comparison effect
that also pushes the bidder to bidmore in order towin
against opponents with relatively high signals. In-
deed, conditional on winning, a bidder prefers his or
her opponent’s signal to be relatively high, as in this
case, he or she is less likely to be disappointed by the
realized value of the good. Thus, the comparison effect
also pushes loss-averse bidders to bid more aggres-
sively than risk-neutral ones. Moreover, notice that
the comparison effect does not arise in an environment
with private values, where the value of the object is
perfectly known. Therefore, under UPE, loss-averse
bidders bid more aggressively in auctions with in-
terdependent values than in comparable auctions
with private values. For concreteness, if types are
uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the equilib-
rium bid—which satisfies (3) as an equality when
t̃ → t—is β∗I (t)  (1+ηg)t + ηg(λg−1)t2/2, which ishigher
than the risk-neutral bid.
Next, we describe the behavior of loss-averse bidders
under CPE. Similar to UPE, with CPE the bidder’s
reference point must be consistent with rational ex-
pectations in equilibrium. Under CPE, however, when
choosing how much to bid, the bidder does not keep
the reference point fixed; instead, the bidder imme-
diately adjusts the reference point to the new bid. Hence,
under CPE a bidder is able to commit to a particular
bid in advance. Then, the expected utility of a bidder of
type t who mimics type t̃ > t is
EU t̃, t
( )  F t̃( ) t +∫ t̃
t
sdF s|t̃( ) − β∗I t̃( )
[ ]
− ηgλg 1 − F t̃( )[ ]F t̃( ) t + ∫ t̃
t
sdF s|t̃( )[ ]
+ ηg 1 − F t̃( )[ ]F t̃( ) t + ∫ t̃
t
sdF s|t̃( )[ ]
− Ω̃ t̃, t̃( ). (4)
Notice the crucial difference between (2) and (4):
under UPE, to evaluate gains and losses, the bidder
uses the lottery induced by the equilibriumbid β∗I (t) as
the reference point; under CPE, instead, the bidder
uses the lottery induced by the deviation β∗I (t̃) as the
reference point. To see how the extensive and in-
tensive risks affect the bidding strategy under CPE, it
is again useful to consider the costs and benefits for a
type-t bidder to mimic type t̃ > t:
EU t,t( )≥EU t̃,t( )
⇔F t̃( )β∗I t̃( )−F t( )β∗I t( )≥ F t̃( )−F t( )[ ]t+∫ t̃
t
sdF s( )
−ηg λg−1( ) 1−F t̃( )( )F t̃( )[ − 1−F t( )( )F t( )]t









+Ω t,t( )−Ω t̃,̃t( )⏟̅̅̅̅̅⏞⏞̅̅̅̅̅⏟
<0
. (5)
The term on the left-hand side of (5) represents the
material cost for a type-t bidder to mimick a higher
type, whereas the first two terms on the right-hand
side represent the material benefits. The other terms
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on the right-hand side of (5) stem from loss aversion.
The first two represent the gain–loss utility associated
with a change in the extensive risk. Under CPE, when
deviating and bidding more aggressively, a bidder is
not only more likely to win but also expects to win
with a higher probability. Hence, under CPE, bidding
more aggressively does not always reduce the like-
lihood of experiencing a loss; in particular, this de-
pends onwhether the bidder’s chances of winning are
higher or lower than 50%, which is the point at which
the extensive risk is the highest. Thus, under CPE, the
extensive risk pushes bidders with relatively high
(resp. low) signals to overbid (resp. underbid) com-
pared with the risk-neutral benchmark. Moreover,
bidding more aggressively also increases the inten-
sive risk, as captured by the last term on the right-
hand side of (5). Indeed, when bidding more ag-
gressively, the bidder also expects to win against
opponents with higher signals; this, in turn, makes it
more likely for the bidder to be ex post disappointed
by the realized value of the good. Therefore, different
from UPE, with CPE the intensive risk creates a
precautionary bidding effect that pushes bidders to
bid less aggressively. For concreteness, if types are
uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the equi-
librium bid is β∗I (t)  [1 − ηg(λg − 1)]t+ ηg(λg − 1)t2,
which is lower than the bid under UPE.
The example in this section already illustratesmany
of the key insights of the general model. The next
sections formalize and further generalize these insights
by considering a more general valuation structure and
additional auction formats with more than two bidders.
3. Unacclimating Personal Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the bidding behavior of
loss-averse bidders under UPE for the FPA and SPA
with interdependent values and compare it with the
risk-neutral and private-value benchmarks.
3.1. First-Price Auctions
We focus on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria which
feature bidding functions that are increasing in the
bidders’ types. To begin, we take the point of view of
bidder i with type ti and consider the order statistics
associated with the types of the other bidders. Let τ1
be the highest of N − 1 values. Also, let F1 be the
distribution of τ1 with corresponding density f1. We
claim the existence of a symmetric equilibrium and
then verify the claim. Consider bidder iwith type ti  t
who bids as if his or her type were t̃ when all other
N − 1 bidders follow the posited equilibrium strat-
egy β∗I (·). This bidder faces a lottery Xt̃ti  (Vi, p) ∈ R2,
which realizes as (vi(t1, t2, . . . , tN) , β∗I (t̃)) if τ1 < t̃ and
as (0, 0) otherwise. Let V(t̃, t) :E[vi(t1, t2, . . . , tN)|ti  t,
τ1 ≤ t̃] denote the expected value of the prize for such a
bidder, conditional onwinning the auction.Moreover,
let F̃(·|t̃ , t) denote the distribution of vi(t1, t2, . . . , tN),
conditional on ti  t and τ1 ≤ t̃, with f̃ (·|t̃, t)denoting the
corresponding density. Then, in a symmetric equilib-
rium, a type-t bidder’s direct utility, when he or she
expects to bid β∗I (t) but deviates and bids β∗I (t̃), as if the
bidder’s typewere t̃ > t, has the followingrepresentation:
EU t̃, t




: F1 t̃( )β∗I t̃( ) + ηm λm[1 − F1(t)]F1 t̃( )β∗I t̃( ){
− F1(t) 1 − F1 t̃( )[ ]β∗I (t)
+λmF1 t̃( )F1(t) β∗I t̃( )−β∗I (t)[ ]},
Ω̃ t̃, t
( )




(x − y)f̃ y|t̃, t( )dy{
× f̃ (x|t, t)dx −




(x − y)f̃ (y|t, t)dy
× f̃ x|t̃, t( )dx},
and
Ψ̃ t̃ , t
( )
: ηg λg 1 − F1 t̃( )[ ]F1(t)V(t, t){
−[1 − F1(t)]F1 t̃( )V t̃ , t( )}.
Note that Ψ̃ captures the extensive risk, whereas Ω̃
captures the intensive one and 7̃I is the bidder’s dis-
utility from deviating to a larger bid. Indeed, if type t
mimics type t̃ > t, then type t, conditional onwinning,
always experiences a loss in themonetary dimension as
β∗I (t̃) > β∗I (t).12 Taking the first-order condition and
evaluating it at t̃  t yields a differential equation
with a solution that provides us with the equilibrium
bidding strategy.
Proposition 1. The symmetric PPE strategies in the FPA
are given by
β∗I t( ) 
∫ t
t
f1 s( )V s, s( ) + F1 s( )V1 s, s( ) − Ψ̃1 s, s( ) + Ω̃1 s, s( )
[ ]
F1 t( ) 1 + ηmλm{ }
× e
ηm λm−1( ) F1 t( )−F1 s( )[ ]
1+ηmλm ds. (7)
Next, we compare (7) with the risk-neutral bid. Sup-
pose first that ηm  0. Then, it is easy to see that β∗I (t) is
equal to the difference between the risk-neutral bid
(the terms that involve V(s, s)) and a term capturing
how a loss-averse bidder reacts to the intensive and
extensive risks, −[Ψ̃1(s, s)+ Ω̃1(s, s)] > 0. Thus, we have
the following result.
Proposition 2. For ηm  0, loss-averse bidders always
overbid relative to risk-neutral bidders.
Hence, underUPE, both the extensive and intensive
risks exert an upward pressure on bids of all types.
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We focus first on the extensive risk, captured by the
term −Ψ̃1(s, s). Under UPE, in equilibrium, bidders
take their reference point as given. This creates an
attachment effect that drives up the equilibrium bid.
Indeed, by increasing their bids, bidders both reduce
the probability of realizing a loss and, at the same
time, increase the probability of realizing a gain.
Next, to see how the intensive risk affects the equi-
librium bidding strategy, we compare (7) with its
private-value analogue, where bidders are exposed
only to the extensive risk. It is easy to see that the
private-value bid has the same structure as in (7) but
without the term −Ω̃1(s, s) > 0. This term captures the
intensive risk, which increases bids via a comparison
effect: bidders have a lower incentive to reduce their
bids, as doing so would imply winning against op-
ponents with lower signals and obtaining an item
with a lower value. Therefore, loss-averse bidders bid
more aggressively in an auction with interdependent
values than in one with private values; thus, they may
fall prey to the winner’s curse. Yet, in our framework,
the winner’s curse does not operate via a form of
limited rationality as in, for instance, the Eyster and
Rabin (2005) model of “cursedness.” In that model,
“cursed” bidders overbid because they overestimate
the good’s value by failing to realize that, conditional
on winning, they have the highest signal. By contrast,
loss-averse bidders hold correct expectations about
the good’s value but bid aggressively in order to re-
duce the chance of being ex post disappointed by its
realized value. Hence, as the intensive risk pushes
them to bid more aggressively, loss-averse bidders
are worse off in an interdependent-value environ-
ment than in a comparable private-value one.13
Proposition 3. For values of ηm that are sufficiently small,
loss-averse bidders receive lower utility in an interdependent-
value environment than in a comparable private-value one.
This result is in stark contrast to the Eső and White
(2004) finding that DARA bidders are made better off
by the riskiness of the good’s value. Moreover, an
interesting implication of Proposition 3 is that, when
facing loss-averse bidders (and under UPE), a revenue-
maximizing seller has a strong incentive to purposely
introduce risk into bidders’ values. This is indeed
consistent with actual practice in many real-world
auctions. For instance, in commercial auctions for fish
in Japan and Australia, sellers usually auction off crates
of fish without disclosing their weight in advance.
Participants in these auctions are usually restaurant
owners whose main goal is to buy as much fish as
possible at a reasonable price. Auctioneers could easily
weigh the crates before the auction and provide this
information publicly to all bidders; yet, they choose
not to. This creates a nonnegligible amount of risk for
bidders who have to come upwith an estimate of how
much fish is in a crate; moreover, bidders are likely to
differ in experience and skills, leading them to come
up with different estimates for the weight. Another
example of auctions in which sellers choose not to dis-
close readily available information is the “name your
own price” selling mechanism used, for instance, by
internet platforms such as Priceline.com. In this type of
auction, a potential buyer makes an offer for a particular
service—such as a one-way flight from Sydney to
Dubai. Theplatform then searcheswithin its database for
deals thatfit only someminimum requirements (e.g., the
flight must depart on the date requested by the buyer)
but without committing to a particular standard of
service (e.g., the trip from Sydney to Dubai might re-
quire two or more layovers). Crucially, the buyer must
accept in advance to pay the offered amount if the plat-
form finds a deal that only meets the minimum re-
quirements. Again, the seller (the platform in this case)
couldeasilyprovidemoredetailed informationabout the
deals, but chooses not to. Yet another example are real
estate auctions inAustralia,where sellers oftenuse secret
reserve prices; indeed, it is not uncommon for prospective
homebuyers to beat the competitors in the auction only to
findout that their bid isbelow the seller’s reserve; insofar
as reserve prices contain some valuable information
about a house’s quality or its resale value, by choosing
not to disclose them, sellers are purposely subjecting
bidders to additional risk over the value of the house.
So far, we have highlighted that, under UPE, both
the intensive risk and extensive risk in the item di-
mension lead tomore aggressive bidding. The following
proposition characterizes the effect of the extensive
risk in money on the equilibrium bid.
Proposition 4. Suppose ηm > 0. Then, an increase in λm
reduces every type’s bid. Moreover, for values of λm that
are sufficiently large, all types underbid compared with risk
neutrality. However, for ηg  ηm and a given λg, there is a
nongeneric set of values ofλm such that every type bids more
aggressively under loss aversion than under risk neutrality.
Hence, if loss aversion overmoney is not too strong,
loss-averse bidders continue to bid more than risk-
neutral ones.
3.2. Second-Price Auctions
In a symmetric equilibrium, a type-t bidder’s direct
utility when he or she expects to bid β∗II(t) but deviates
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and bids β∗II(t̃), as if his or her type were t̃ > t, has the
following representation:14
EU t̃, t
( )  F1 t̃( )V t̃, t( ) − Ψ̃ t̃, t( ) − Ω̃ t̃, t( ) − 7̃II t̂, t( ), (8)





















∫ min x,t{ }
t
β∗II x( ) − β∗II y
( )[ ]{




β∗II x( ) − β∗II y
( )[ ]
× f1 y( )dyf1 x( )dx
}
.
Comparing (8) with (6), we see that the two differ
only in those terms related to the bidder’s payment,
7̃I and 7̃II . Indeed, the SPA exposes bidders to ad-
ditional intensive risk in their payment in the event of
winning the auction. The following proposition char-
acterizes the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies
for the SPA under UPE.
Proposition 5. The symmetric PPE strategies in the SPA
are given by
β∗II t( ) 
1
1+ ηmλm









f1 s( )V s, s( ) + F1 s( )V1 s, s( ){
− Ψ̃1 s, s( ) + Ω̃1 s, s( )[ ]}eηm λm−1( ) F1 t( )−F1 s( )[ ]1+ηmλm ds. (9)
It is easy to verify that results analogous to those in
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 also apply to the SPA. Thus,
β∗II(t) is increasing in both the extensive and intensive
risk, and if ηm  0, loss-averse buyers always bid
more aggressively than risk-neutral ones (and they
continue to do so for ηm > 0 as long as λm is not
too large). Moreover, the difference between the
common-value bidding strategy and the private-
value one is given by the term related to the in-
tensive risk in consumption, which exerts an addi-
tional upward pressure on the bids. Hence, as in the
FPA, the extensive risk and intensive risk work in the
same direction and induce loss-averse bidders to bid
more aggressively compared with the case of private
values.
3.3. FPA vs. SPA
We have shown that, under UPE, loss-averse bidders
react to both the intensive and extensive risks in the
good dimension by increasing their bids. The exten-
sive risk increases bids via the attachment effect—fixing
the reference point, bidders have a higher willingness
to pay and thus bidmore in order to reduce the chance
of experiencing a loss in the item dimension when
failing to win the auction. The intensive risk instead
increases bids via the comparison effect—bidders
have a lower incentive to reduce their bids, as doing
so would imply winning against opponents with
lower signals and obtaining an item of lower value.
Bidding more aggressively, however, also exposes
bidders to losses in the money dimension. The next
proposition shows that the implications for the seller’s
revenue are the same in both auction formats.
Proposition 6. If bidders bid according to the PPE, then the
FPA is revenue equivalent to the SPA.
The intuition is that, in both formats, equilibrium
behavior is driven by a bidder’s desire to bid more
aggressively in order to reduce potential losses. Bidding
more aggressively in the FPA entails a loss in the money
dimension—conditional on winning—exactly equal to
the increase in the bid; this, in turn, partially mitigates
the desire to bid aggressively. In contrast, biddingmore
aggressively in the SPA leads to a monetary loss only if
the bidder is tiedwith his or her strongest opponent. Yet,
in the SPA, the payment conditional on winning is un-
certain; this additional intensive risk also partially miti-
gates the desire to bid aggressively. In the PPE, these two
negative effects have exactly the samemagnitude, so that
the two auction formats raise the same expected revenue.
4. Choice-Acclimating
Personal Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the FPA and SPA under
CPE and show that the effects of the extensive and
intensive risks on the bidding strategies are remarkably
different than under UPE.
4.1. First-Price Auctions
Let F1, f1, V(t̃, t), F̃(·|t̃, t), and f̃ (·|t̃, t) be defined as in
Section 3, and recall that Λl : ηl(λl − 1) for l ∈ {g,m}.
We claim the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
and then verify the claim. Consider bidder iwith type
ti  twhobids as if his or her typewere t̃when all other
N − 1 bidders follow the posited equilibrium strat-
egy β∗I (·). Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, a type-t bid-
der’s direct utility when he or she expects to bid β∗I (t)
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but deviates and bids β∗I (t̃), as if the bidder’s typewere
t̃ > t, has the following representation:
EU t̃, t








(x − y)f̃ y|t̃, t( )dy
× f̃ x|t̃, t( )dx
captures the intensive risk whereas Ψ(t̃, t) : Λg[1 −
F1(t̃)]F1(t̃)V(t̃, t) captures the extensive risk, and7I(t̃) :
F1(t̃)β∗I (t̃){1+ Λm[1 − F1(t̃)]}. Notice the difference be-
tween (10) and (6). Under CPE, the reference point
adjusts to the deviation, and the extensive and intensive
risks depend only on t̃, the type the bidder pretends to
be. Under UPE, instead, these risks depend also on t, the
bidder’s true type. Taking the first-order condition
and evaluating it at t̃  t yields a differential equation
whose solution provides us with the equilibrium bid-
ding strategy.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1, symmetric equilib-




t f1 s( )V s,s( )+F1 s( )V1 s,s( )
{ − Ψ1 s,s( )+Ω1 s,s( )[ ]}ds
F1 t( ) 1+Λm 1−F1 t( )[ ]{ } .
(11)
To highlight the effect of the risk in the good’s value
on the behavior of a loss-averse bidder, it is useful to
compare the bidding function in (11) with its private-
value analogue in Lange and Ratan (2010). It is easy to
see that the private-value bid has the same structure as
in (11) but without the term −Ω1(s, s) < 0. Hence, this
term captures the impact of the intensive risk on the
bidder’s equilibrium strategy. Different from UPE,
when deviating to a higher bid, the bidder’s reference
point adjusts immediately; hence, bidding more ag-
gressively raises the expected value of the good
conditional on winning and thus the probability of
experiencing a loss. Loss-averse bidders dislike risk in
consumption outcomes. Thus, the intensive risk creates
a precautionary bidding effect that reduces bids com-
pared with the case of private values.
Next, we compare β∗I (t) to the risk-neutral bid
βRNI (t). We start with the following observation.
Observation 1. Notice that ∂β
∗
I (t)
∂Λm ≤ 0 ∀t and the inequal-
ity is strict if t ∈ (0, t).
Intuitively, loss aversion over money lowers equi-
librium bids compared with the risk-neutral bench-
mark, as loss-averse bidders dislike the extensive risk
in monetary outcomes. Yet, the strategy of the bidder
with the highest signal is not affected by Λm, as in
equilibrium, the bidder expects towin the auction and
pay his or her bid for sure. The same applies to the
bidder with the lowest signal who expects to never
win the auction and hence to never pay. The following
proposition compares β∗I (t) to βRNI (t) for anyΛg andΛm.
Proposition 8. Let tm be such that F1(tm)  0.5.Comparing
β∗I (t) to βRNI (t), we have the following:
(i) If t ≤ tm, then β∗I (t) < βRNI (t).
(ii) There is a t′ such that, for t ≥ t′, β∗I (t) ≥ βRNI (t) if and
only if
∫ t
t Ω1(x, x)+ Ψ1(x, x)dx ≤ 0.
Proposition 8 characterizes how the behavior of
loss-averse bidders differs from their risk-neutral
counterparts. Whether a loss-averse bidder behaves
moreor less aggressively thana risk-neutral onedepends
on the magnitudes of the extensive and intensive risks.
Whereas the intensive risk unambiguously pushes loss-
averse bidders to bid less aggressively compared with
the risk-neutral benchmark, the effect of the extensive
risk depends on the bidder’s type. First, consider those
bidders whose type is (weakly) lower than tm. These
bidders have less than a 50% chance of winning the
auction and bid less than their risk-neutral counter-
parts. The intuition is as follows.When comparing the
outcome of winning the auction to its counterfactual,
a loss-averse bidder with type t experiences expected
gain–loss (dis)utility proportional to −Ψ(t, t). Notice
that, fixing V(t̃, t), Ψ(t̃, t) is maximized at F1(t̃)  0.5,
which is the point with the highest extensive risk.
Bidders who expect to win with less than 50% prob-
ability do not feel attached to the good and therefore
bid less aggressively to keep their expectations low
and mitigate their disappointment if they lose. Hence,
for these bidders, both the intensive risk and the ex-
tensive risk have a negative effect on bids. In contrast,
bidders who expect to win with more than 50% prob-
ability have an incentive to increase their bids in order
to reduce their extensive risk. Thus, the effect of the
extensive riskmust outweigh that of the intensive risk
for these bidders to bid more aggressively than their
risk-neutral counterparts. The condition in part ii
reveals that this depends on the comparison between
the extensive and intensive risks for the bidder with
the highest type. If the condition holds as a strict
inequality, then a bidder with type t bids strictlymore
than under risk neutrality, and so do bidders with
types sufficiently close to t. Hence, high-type bidders
can be exposed to the winner’s curse in equilibrium.
By contrast, the Eyster and Rabin (2005) model of
cursedness predicts that low-type bidders overbid
and high-type bidders underbid compared with
the risk-neutral benchmark. Therefore, although
cursedness implies that those bidders who are more
pessimistic about the good’s value will overbid,
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expectations-based loss aversion yields the exact op-
posite prediction.
4.2. Second-Price Auctions
Consider bidder iwith type ti  twho plans to bid as if
his or her type were t̃ > twhen all otherN − 1 bidders
follow the posited symmetric equilibrium strategy
β∗II(·). The bidder’s expected utility is
EU t̃, t







β∗II τ1( )f1 τ1( )dτ1 1+Λm 1−F1 t̃











Comparing (12) with (10), it is easy to see that the two
expressions differ only in those terms that are related
to the bidder’s payment. Intuitively, as we are fo-
cusing on equilibria in increasing strategies, the two
auction formats lead to the same allocation of the
good. Yet, in the SPA, bidders face risk regarding their
monetary payment when winning, whereas this risk
is not present in the FPA. In particular, 7II(t̃) contains
an additional term, −Λm ∫ t̃t (∫ xt (β∗II(x)−β∗II(v))f1(v)dv)×
f1(x)dx, which captures the expected gain–loss (dis)
utility in the money dimension arising from the in-
tensive risk in the payment. The following proposi-
tion describes the symmetric equilibrium strategies
for the SPA.
Proposition 9. Under Assumption 1, symmetric equilibrium
strategies in the SPA are given by
β∗II t( ) 
f1 t( )V t, t( ) + F1 t( )V1 t, t( ) − Ψ1 t, t( ) +Ω1 t, t( )[ ]





f1 s( )V s, s( ) + F1 s( )V1 s, s( ){
− Ψ1 s, s( ) +Ω1 s, s( )[ ]}e2Λm F1 t( )−F1 s( )[ ]1+Λm ds
1 +Λm( )2 . (13)
It is easy to verify that β∗II(t) has the same structure as its
private-value analogue in Lange and Ratan (2010) but
with anadditional term,−Ω1(t, t) < 0, which comes from
the intensive risk. The following proposition compares
β∗II(t) to the risk-neutral bid, βRNII , for any Λg and Λm.
Proposition 10. Let tm be such that F1(tm)  0.5. Com-
paring β∗II(t) to βRNII (t), we have the following:
(i) If t ≤ tm, then β∗II(t) < βRNII (t) for any Λm.
(ii) There are Λ̂m > 0 and t′ such that, forΛm < Λ̂m and
t ≥ t′, β∗II(t) ≥ βRNII (t) if and only if Ψ1(t, t)+ Ω1(t, t) ≤ 0.
As in the FPA, loss aversion has a bifurcating effect.
First, loss-averse bidders who have less than a 50%
chance of winning the auction bid less than their risk-
neutral counterparts; this holds true irrespective of
the strength of loss aversion over money. Second,
when loss aversion over money is not too strong,
those bidders with relatively high types might overbid
compared with the risk-neutral benchmark. This hap-
pens if and only if the condition in part ii is satisfied.
Notice that this condition is a differential version of the
condition in part ii of Proposition 8; indeed, different
from β∗I (t), β∗II(t) depends on the derivative of the net
utility. In both the FPA and the SPA, the difference in
the expected payments between type t and a slightly
lower type t′ is the difference in the net utility type t
receives from not imitating t′. In the SPA, however, a
change in his or her bid affects a bidder’s payment
only when he or she is tied with the strongest com-
petitor. Finally, the reason why loss aversion over
money cannot be too strong for the result in part ii to
hold is that the SPA exposes bidders to intensive risk
also in the money dimension. Hence, if loss aversion
over money is strong enough, bidders will reduce
their bids comparedwith the risk-neutral benchmark,
irrespective of their signals.
4.3. FPA vs. SPA
In equilibrium, the FPA and SPA lead to the same
allocation of the good and thus expose the bidders
to the same extensive risk. Yet, the payment rule
of the SPA exposes bidders to additional intensive
risk in money. If Λm > 0, this implies that bidders
have a lower direct utility in the SPA than in the
FPA. In equilibrium, however, bidders react by ap-
propriately shading down their bids in the SPA, and
as a result, they enjoy the same equilibrium utility
in both auction formats. Hence, we have the follow-
ing result.
Proposition 11. In equilibrium, bidders attain the same
utility in both auction formats. However, the expected pay-
ment of the type-t bidder, for t > t, is strictly larger in the
FPA than in the SPA if Λm > 0.
The following corollary is an immediate conse-
quence of Proposition 11.
Corollary 1. The expected revenue in the SPA is the same as
in the FPA if Λm  0, and it is strictly lower if Λm > 0.
Corollary 1 extends the Lange and Ratan (2010)
revenue-ranking result for auctionswith independent
private values to the caseof interdependentvalues.Recall
that with risk-neutral bidders, the revenue equiva-
lence theorem applies to our model because bidders’
signals are independent. Moreover, in the Milgrom
andWeber (1982) general symmetric model with risk-
neutral bidders and affiliated signals, the SPA yields a
higher expected revenue than the FPA.15 Our analysis
instead shows that if bidders are loss-averse and
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signals are independent, revenue-maximizing sellers
should favor the FPA over the SPA.
5. UPE vs. CPE
In this section we compare the different implications
of UPE and CPE for bidders’ behavior and welfare.
Under UPE, both the attachment effect and the com-
parison effect make it attractive for bidders to raise
their bids, independently of their signal. In particular,
because of the comparison effect, a bidder wants to
bid aggressively in order to win against opponents
with high signals. Indeed, by doing so, the bidder is
less likely to be disappointed about the value of the
good when winning the auction; that is, the intensive
risk in the good dimension pushes bidders to bid
aggressively and exposes them to the winner’s curse.
By contrast, under CPE, the attachment effect makes
it attractive for bidders to raise their bid only if, by doing
so, they can reduce the extensive risk; this, however,
only happens if the bidder’s signal is sufficiently high.
Moreover, and in stark contrast to UPE, the com-
parison effect stemming from the intensive risk de-
creases the bids. This is because a bidder’s reference
point immediately adjusts to the new bid he or she
chooses. Yet, after having formed a reference point
and having submitted a bid, under CPE, a loss-averse
bidder regrets not having bid more because, by doing
so, he or she could have reduced the likelihood of
experiencing a loss. Thus, under CPE, loss-averse bidders
suffer from a loser’s curse similar to the one identified
by Holt and Sherman (1994) and Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997). If ηm is small, then, in each auction
format, thebids in thePPEare larger than thoseunderCPE.
Proposition 12. There exists η̂m > 0 such that, if ηm ≤ η̂m,
bids are larger in the PPE than under CPE for both the FPA
and SPA.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 12 is that,
although bidders suffer from a loser’s curse under CPE,
they are better off than in the PPE.
Corollary 2. For ηm ≤ η̂m, bidders are better off under CPE
than in the PPE.
By Proposition 12, for ηm ≤ η̂m, a bidder’s expected
payment in each auction format is lower under CPE
than under UPE.16 On the equilibrium path, however,
bidders hold the same reference points in both auction
formats and face the same lottery over their material
outcomes. Thus, bidders must receive a larger utility
under CPE than in the PPE. This result implies that
loss-averse bidders have an incentive to commit in
advance to their bids, which can rationalize several
tactics often employed by bidders in many real-world
auctions. For instance, in internet auctions such as
eBay, bidders often use a proxy that submits bids on
their behalf and thereby allows them to precommit to
a maximum price. Similarly, another form of com-
mitment, often used in auctions for real estate or
collectable items, is hiring an agent who submits bids
on behalf of the actual buyer and is instructed not to
bid above a prespecified price.
Finally, the next proposition shows that none of
these results depend on the assumption that bidders’
utility is linear in the material payoffs.
Proposition 13. The results of Proposition 12 and Corollary 2
continue to hold for any monotone transformation of the ma-
terial payoffs.
6. Loss Aversion vs. Risk Aversion
In this section, we compare the behavior of loss-
averse bidders with that of risk-averse ones for the
case where the bidder’s value is additively separable
in his or her own signal. First, we compare the behavior
of loss-averse bidders with that of DARA bidders. Eső
and White (2004) showed that, in interdependent-
value auctions, DARA bidders display a precautionary
bidding behavior: they respond to the risk in the good’s
value by decreasing their equilibrium bid by more
than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Thus,
DARA bidders prefer participating in an interdependent-
value setting to participating in a private-value one.
Under CPE, loss-averse bidders also reduce their bid in
response to the intensive risk. Yet, the reduction in the
bid is exactly equal to the disutility bidders suffer from
the uncertainty in the good’s value; hence, they are as
well off as in a comparable private-value environment
without intensive risk. Under UPE, instead, bidders
react to the intensive risk in the good’s value by ac-
tually increasing their bid. Hence, they not only fully
internalize the disutility from the uncertainty in the
good’s value but also suffer from a larger expected
payment resulting from their attempt to minimize
losses. Therefore, for moderate degrees of money-loss
aversion, under UPE, bidders are worse off in an
interdependent-value environment than in a comparable
private-value one; on the other hand, the seller is strictly
better off in an interdependent-value environment.
These different implications stem from the difference
in how the intensive risk affects the incentives of
DARA bidders and loss-averse bidders under UPE.
Under DARA, bidders’ degree of risk aversion de-
creases in their wealth, which is their private type.
Bidders with more optimistic signals are therefore
less risk-averse and enjoy an additional information
rent from this heterogeneity in the degree of risk
aversion. Under UPE, in equilibrium, bidders’ (stochas-
tic) reference point is correlated with their type so
that bidders with more optimistic signals also have
a more optimistic reference point, which makes it
more likely for them to be disappointed compared
with bidders with less optimistic signals. By contrast,
under CPE (as with risk neutrality), the direct utility
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only depends on the action taken, as when deviating
from their equilibrium strategy, bidders immediately
adjust their reference point. Hence, under CPE, bid-
ders have fewer incentives to bid aggressively, as this
increases their reference point, thereby exposing them
to a higher probability of realizing a loss.
Next, we compare the behavior of loss-averse bidders
with that of CARA bidders. With CARA preferences,
bidders are exposed to the same extensive risk in the
FPA as in the SPA; thus, it is the intensive risk that
determines the auction’s revenue. Indeed, we have the
following result.
Proposition 14. With CARA bidders, the auction format
that induces less variance in bidders’ payoffs conditional on
winning raises the highest revenue. Moreover, CARA bidders
behave less aggressively than risk-neutral bidders.
The first part of Proposition 14 shows that, for
CARA bidders, as for loss-averse bidders under CPE,
it is the intensive risk that determines the perfor-
mance of a selling mechanism. Yet, under CARA, the
SPA might entail a smaller intensive risk than the
FPA. In this case, thewinner’s expected payment—and
thus, the seller’s revenue—is larger in the SPA than
in the FPA, as shown for instance by Murto and
Valimäki (2015) for the case of large auctions. With
loss-averse bidders under CPE, instead, the opposite re-
sult holds. Moreover, the second part of Proposition 14
states that, in both auction formats, CARA bidders
bid less than risk-neutral ones, as Menicucci (2004)
shows for the FPA. In contrast, loss-averse bidders
might bid more than risk-neutral ones under CPE as
well as UPE.
7. Conclusion
Ample evidence, gathered from both the field and the
laboratory, indicates that people evaluate outcomes
not (only) in absolute terms but (also) relative to a
reference point, and that losses (relative to this ref-
erence point) loom larger than equal-size gains; see,
for instance, Kahneman et al. (1990, 1991) on the
endowment effect in laboratory trade experiments;
Odean (1998), Genesove andMayer (2001), andMeng
andWeng (2017) on the disposition effect in the stock
and housing market; and Crawford and Meng (2011)
on cabdrivers’ labor supply decisions. In particular,
as shown by Lange and Ratan (2010), Banerji and
Gupta (2014), Eisenhuth (2019), Rosato (2019), Rosato
and Tymula (2019), and von Wangenheim (2017),
expectations-based loss aversion has important im-
plications for auction design.
Whereas these previous contributions have focused
solely on auctionswith private values, our paper is the
first to study the role of expectations-based loss aversion
in auctions with interdependent values. Our analysis
highlights how the behavior of loss-averse bidders
depends on how they react to the extensive and in-
tensive risk, which in turn depends on the extent to
which bidders incorporate their bid into their reference
point. In particular, the intensive risk in the good’s
value—which represents the main difference with
respect to private-value environments—affects the bid-
ding behavior of loss-averse bidders in opposite ways
under UPE compared to CPE.
Our findings have important implications for the
welfare of bidders and the auctioneer’s revenue.
Concerning the bidders, we have shown that, under
both UPE and CPE, loss aversion exposes them to the
winner’s curse; yet, the testable predictions of our
model differ from those of models based on bounded
rationality, such as cursedness à la Eyster and Rabin
(2005) and “level-k” bidding à la Crawford and Iriberri
(2007).Moreover, underCPE, bidders also suffer from
a loser’s curse as they commit to their bid in advance,
but afterward regret not having bid higher; however,
exactly because of this ability to commit, loss-averse
bidders attain a higher utility under CPE than UPE.
Hence, our model provides a new explanation for the
use of commitment devices in auctions, such as proxy
bidding in online auctions.
With respect to the auctioneer, we have shown that
revenue equivalence might fail even if bidders have
independent signals. Indeed, under CPE, the FPA
yields a higher revenue than the SPA; moreover, this
ranking might continue to hold also when bidders’ sig-
nals are affiliated (see the web appendix for details).
Finally, our results identify the intensive risk as a
crucial determinant of the auctioneer’s revenue. In
particular, risk in the good’s value leads to more (resp.
less) aggressive bidding under UPE (resp. CPE). Hence,
revenue decreases (resp. increases) if the auctioneer
provides bidders with additional information about
the good’s value under UPE (resp. CPE).
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Appendix. Proofs
Definition (∗). The following two expressions play an im-
portant role in some of the proofs:
9 τ1, t( ) :
∫ v t,τ1 ,... ,τ1( )
v t,τ1 ,t,... ,t( )
xdF̃τ1 ,t x( ) and
+ τ1, y1, t
( )
:
∫ v t,τ1 ,... ,τ1( )
max v t,τ1 ,t,... ,t( ),v t,y1 ,t,... ,t( ){ }
×
∫ x
v t,y1 ,t,... ,t( )
x − y( )dF̃y1 ,t y( )dF̃τ1 ,t x( ),
where F̃τ1 ,t is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
v(t, τ1, . . .). In words, 9(τ1, t) is the expected value of the
prize to a type-t bidder conditional on winning and on his or
her strongest competitor having type τ1; similarly, +(τ1, y1, t)
represents the expected gain (resp. loss) of a type-t bidder
conditional on (resp. expecting to) winning against a bidder
with type τ1 while expecting to win (resp. winning) against a
bidder with type y1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Differentiating the direct utility
function, (6), with respect to t̃ and evaluating the first-order
condition at t̃  t yields the following differential equation:
F1 t( )β∗I t( )
( )′+ηm λm 1 − F1 t( )( ) F1 t( )β∗I t( )( )′{ + f1 t( )β∗I t( )F1 t( )
+ λm β∗I t( )
( )′F1 t( )F1 t( )}
 f1 t( )V t, t( ) + F1 t( )V1 t, t( ) − Ψ̃1 t, t( ) − Ω̃1 t, t( ).
Solving this equation yields expression (7) in the text. Next,
we verify sufficiency. To do so, we show that the cross-partial
derivative of the direct utility function is positive. Under UPE,
the direct utility reads as follows:
EU t̃, t
( )  ∫ t̃
t














+ τ1, y1, t
( )






+ τ1, y1, t
( )
f1 τ1( )f1 y1( )dy1dτ1
−7I t̃, t( ), (A.1)
where9 and+ are defined as in (∗). Differentiating (A.1) with





1 + ηg( ) + ηgλg ∫ t
t







( ) −+ t̃, y1, t( )[ ] f1 y1( )dy1
]




In Lemma 1 in the web appendix, we show that the de-
rivative of the aforementioned expression with respect to t
is positive. Hence, EU(t̃, t) satisfies single crossing, which
implies sufficiency of the first-order condition. Next, notice
that single crossing of EU(t̃, t) also implies that the objective
function satisfies the strict Spence-Mirrlees condition as de-
fined by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Hence, β∗I (t) is in-
creasing by Theorem 4 inMilgrom and Shannon (1994). Finally,
we show that the bidding function presented in (7) represents
the PPE. To see this,we derive the set of all personal equilibrium
(PE) bids. Take any increasing function βI. If this is an equi-
librium bid, then bidder t has no incentive to mimic a lower
type t̃ < t. The bidder’s payoff from mimicking a lower type is
EU t̃, t
( )  F1 t̃( )V t̃, t( ) − Ψ̃ t̃, t( ) − Ω̃ t̃, t( ) − F1 t̃( )βI t̃( )
− ηm λm 1 − F1 t( )[ ]F1 t̃( )βI t̃( ){
− F1 t( ) 1 − F1 t̃( )[ ]βI t( ) − F1 t̃( )F1 t( ) βI t̃( ) − βI t( )[ ]}.
In equilibrium, limt̃→t(EU(t, t) − EU(t̃ , t)) ≥ 0, which is
equivalent to
A1 t, t( ) ≥ F1 t( )βI t( )( )′+ηm λm 1 − F1 t( )( ) F1 t( )βI t( )( )′{
+ f1 t( )βI t( )F1 t( ) + βI t( )′F1 t( )2}, (A.2)
whereA(t̃, t)  F1(t̃)V(t̃, t) − Ψ̃(t̃ , t) − Ω̃(t̃, t). Making (A.2) bind
and solving the resulting differential equation provides us
with an upper bound, β, on any PE bidding strategy. Similarly,
to derive a lower bound on any PE bidding strategy, we
need to ensure that a bidder of type t does not want to
deviate and mimic a higher type t̃ > t. The bidder’s payoff
from mimicking a higher type is given by (6) in the main
text. In equilibrium, limt̃→t(EU(t, t) − EU(t̃, t)) ≥ 0, which is
equivalent to
A1 t, t( ) ≤ F1 t( )βI t( )( )′+ηm λm 1−F1 t( )( ){ F1 t( )βI t( )( )′
+ f1 t( )βI t( )F1 t( )+λm βI t( )( )′F1 t( )F1 t( )}. (A.3)
Making (A.3) bind and solving the resulting differential
equation provides us with a lower bound, β, on any PE
bidding strategy. Thus, PE bidding strategies must lie in
the set [β, β]. Finally, notice that the ex ante preferred
strategy is the one where bidders pay the least; that is, β is
the PPE. Hence, β∗I  β. □
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ηm  0 and observe that F1(t) ×
[β∗I (t) − b∗I (t)]  −
∫ t
t (Ψ̃1(s, s)+ Ω̃1(s, s))ds. Then, it suffices to
show that −Ψ̃1(t, t) − Ω̃1(t, t) > 0. Using the representation
in (A.1), we can identify −Ψ̃1(t, t) − Ω̃1(t, t) as
f1 t( ) 9 t, t( )ηg + ηgλg
∫ t
t






9 t, t( ) −+ t, y1, t( )[ ] f1 y1( )dy1
}
,
where 9 and + are defined as in (∗). This term is posi-
tive because (1 − F1(t))9(t, t) > 0, 9(τ1, t) −+(τ1, t, t) > 0, and
+(t, y1, t) > 0. □
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (6), we have
EU t( )  F1 t( )V t, t( ) − Ψ̃ t, t( ) − Ω̃ t, t( ) − F1 t( )β∗I t( )
× 1 + ηm λm − 1( ) 1 − F1 t( )[ ]{ }.
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Similarly, under private values (i.e., whenV(t, t)  h(t)), the
equilibrium utility, EUPV , reads as
EUPV t( )  F1 t( )h t( ) − ηg λg 1 − F1 t( )[ ]F1 t̃( )h t( ){
− 1 − F1 t̃( )[ ]F1 t( )h t( )} − F1 t( )b∗I t( )
× 1 + ηm λm − 1( ) 1 − F1 t( )[ ]{ } ,
where b∗I (t) is the private-value bid. Recall that v(ti, t−i) 
h(ti) + g(t−i); then, substituting for the bids, the difference in
the equilibrium utility between the common-value and the
private-value environments is
F1 t( )q t( )−
∫ t
t
F1 s( )q′ s( ) + f1 s( )q s( ){ }w s, t( )ds




ηgλgf1 s( )q s( ) + ηgf1 s( )q s( ) 1 − F1 s( )[ ]{
+ ηg 1 − F1 s( )[ ]F1 s( )q′ s( )}w s, t( )ds
− Ω̃ t, t( ) +
∫ t
t
Ω̃1 s, s( )w s, t( )ds, (A.4)
where q(t̃) : E[g(t−i)|τ1 ≤ t̃] and w(s, t) : 1+ηm(λm−1)[1−F1(t)]1+ηmλm ×
e
ηm (λm−1)
1+ηmλm (F1(t)−F1(s)). Observe first that the third and fourth terms
of (A.4) are always negative. Moreover, if ηm  0, then
w(s, t)  1 and the first two terms of (A.4) add up to zero. If
ηm  0, the last term is negative because −Ω̃(t, t) +∫ t
t Ω̃1(s, s)ds  −
∫ t
t Ω̃2(s, s)ds < 0. Thus, if ηg > 0, λg > 1, and
ηm  0, then the claim holds true for any λm. By continuity,
we can find a sufficiently small ηm such that the payoff
difference is negative. □
Proof of Proposition 4. The first statement immediately
follows from the equilibrium bid. Moreover, if λm grows large,
the denominator grows without bound, which proves the
second statement. To prove the last statement, we
evaluate the bidding function at ηg  ηm  η and λm  1.




1+η ds. The last
step in the proof of Proposition 2 implies that −[Ψ̃1(s, s) +
Ω̃1(s, s)] is strictly increasing in λg. Applying partial in-
tegration, it is easy to see that
Ω̃ t̃, t






1 − F̃ y|t, t( )( )dy[
−
∫ v t,t̃( )
v t,t( )
F̃ y|t, t( ) 1 − F̃ y⃒⃒⃒⃒t̃, t( )( )dy].
Thus, at λg  1, we have
Ω̃1 t, t( )  F1 t( )2







Moreover, note that V(t̃, t) has the following representation:
V t̃, t
( )  ∫ v t,t̃( )
v t,t( )
xf̃ x|t̃, t( )dx  v t, t̃( ) − ∫ v t,t̃( )
v t,t( )
F x|t̃, t( )dx.
Hence, it follows that
V1 t, t( )  v2 t, t( ) − v2 t, t( ) −
∫ v t, t( )
v t,t( )






Thus, for λg  1, we have that −Ω̃1(s, s)  F1(s)2V1(s, s);
hence, the risk-neutral and the loss-averse bid coincide. By
continuity, therefore, for every λg > 1, we can find an upper
bound on λm such that the claim holds. □
Proof of Proposition 5. Differentiating the direct utility (8)
with respect to t̃ and evaluating the first-order condition at
t̃  t yields the following differential equation:
β∗II t( )f1 t( ) 1 + ηmλm
( ) − ∫ t
t
β∗II s( )f1 s( )dsf1 t( )ηm λm − 1( )  A1 t, t( ),
where A(t̃, t) : F1(t̃)V(t̃, t) − Ψ̃(t̃ , t) − Ω̃(t̃, t). Define !(t) :
A1(t, t)/f1(t). Then,
β∗II t( ) 1 + ηmλm
( ) − ∫ t
t
β∗II s( )f1 s( )dsηm λm − 1( )  ! t( ).
Differentiating and dividing by (1+ ηmλm) on both sides,
we obtain
β∗II t( )
( )′−β∗II t( )f1 t( ) ηm λm − 1( )1 + ηmλm  !′ t( )1 + ηmλm .
The solution of this differential equation reads
















1 + ηmλm ! t( ) +






! s( )f1 s( )e




Substituting for !(t) leads to (9). Sufficiency of the first-
order condition and monotonicity of β∗II(t) follow from ar-
guments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1. □
Proof of Proposition 6. Let A(t̃ , t) be defined as in the proof
of Proposition 5. We have that
F1 t( )β∗I t( ) −
∫ t
t
β∗II θ1( )f1 θ1( )dθ1  0 ⇔∫ t
t
A1 s, s( ) e











A1 v, v( )e
ηm λm−1( ) F1 s( )−F1 v( )[ ]






A1 v, v( )e
ηm λm−1( ) F1 s( )−F1 v( )[ ]
1+ηmλm dvf1 s( )ds
 1 + η
mλm








A1 v, v( )e
−ηm λm−1( )F1 v( )
1+ηmλm dvds
 1 + η
mλm
ηm λm − 1( ) e




A1 s, s( )e






A1 s, s( )ds
]
,
Balzer and Rosato: Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–19, © 2020 The Author(s) 15
where the second equality follows by applying integration
by parts. Thus, (A.5) holds with equality. □
Proof of Proposition 8. Claim (i) Observe first that
β∗I t( ) ≤
∫ t
t
f1 s( )V s, s( ) + F1 s( )V1 s, s( ){
− Ψ1 s, s( ) +Ω1 s, s( )[ ]}ds/F1 t( ), (A.6)
because β∗I (t) is decreasing in Λm. We show that (A.6) is
lower than the risk-neutral bid,
∫ t
t { f1(s)V(s,s)+F1(s)V1(s,s)}ds/
F1(t), for t ≤ tm. Indeed, it is easily verified that Ω1(s, s) > 0,
whereas−Ψ1(s,s) −Λg[1−F1(s)]F1(s)V1(s,s)+Λg[2F1(s) −1]
f1(s)V(s,s) can only be positive if F1(t) > 0.5.
Claim (ii) We derive a condition for when the highest
type bidsmore aggressively under loss aversion than under
risk neutrality. Because the difference in these two bids is con-
tinuous in the type, whenever this condition is satisfied for the
highest type, there exists a threshold type, t′, such that every
t ∈ [t′, t̄] bids more aggressively than under risk neutrality.
Note that for t  t̄, (A.6) is satisfiedwith equality for anyΛm.
Thus, the highest type overbids relative to risk neutrality
if and only if
∫ t̄
t [Ψ1(s, s) + Ω1(s, s)]ds < 0. □
Proof of Proposition 7. Differentiating the direct utility
function with respect to t̃ and evaluating the first-order
condition at t̃  t yields the following differential equation:
F1 t( )V1 t, t( ) + f1 t( )V t, t( ) −Ψ1 t, t( ) −Ω1 t, t( )
F1 t( ) 1 + Λm 1 − F1 t( )[ ]{ }
 β∗I t( )
f1 t( ) 1 +Λm 1 − 2F1 t( )[ ]{ }




Solving this differential equation yields the bidding func-
tion in the text. Next, as in Proposition 1, sufficiency of the
first-order conditions and monotonicity of the bidding
function hold if the direct utility satisfies single crossing—that
is, if ∂
2EU(t̃,t)
∂t̃∂t > 0. Under CPE, the direct utility reads as follows:
EU t̃, t
( )  ∫ t̃
t














+ τ1, y1, t
( )






+ τ1, y1, t
( )
f1 τ1( )f1 y1( )dy1dτ1
−7I t̃( ), (A.7)
where9 and+ are defined as in (∗). Differentiating (A.7) with
respect to t̃ yields
f1 t̃
( )
1 − Λg( )9 t̃, t( ) +Λg ∫ t̃
t











Differentiating the aforementioned expressionwith respect
to t, we obtain
f1 t̃
( )
1 −Λg( )92 t̃, t( )+ Λg∫ t̃
t






( ) −+3 t̃, y1, t( )[ ] f1 y1( )dy1
}
.
Notice that 92(t̃, t) > 0 and Λg ≤ 1; moreover, Lemma 2 in
the web appendix shows that
∫ t̃
t [92(τ1, t) −+3(τ1, t̃, t)] ×
f1(τ1)dτ1 > 0 and
∫ t̃
t [92(t̃, t) −+3(t̃ , y1, t)] f1(y1)dy1 > 0. Hence,
∂2EU(t̃,t)
∂t̃∂t > 0. □
Proof of Proposition 9. Define !(t, t) : f1(t)V(t, t) + F1(t) ×
V1(t, t) −Ψ1(t, t) −Ω1(t, t). Differentiating the direct utility func-
tion with respect to t̃, equating it with zero, and evaluating it
at t̃  t yields the following equation:
A1 t, t( )
f1 t( )  β
∗
II t( ) 1 + Λm[ ] − 2Λm
∫ t
t
β∗II v( )f1 v( )dv. (A.8)




A1 t, t( )
f1 t( )
( )′
 β∗II t( )
( )′− 2Λmf1 t( )
1 + Λm β
∗
II t( ).
Solving the aforementioned differential equation yields













A1 t, t( )













where the second equality follows from partial integration
and A1(t, t)/f1(t)  0. Sufficiency and monotonicity of β∗II
follow from arguments similar to those in the proof of
Proposition 7. □
Proof of Proposition 10. Claim (i) Observe first that




because β∗II is decreasing in Λm. We show that (A.9) is lower
than the risk-neutral bid, { f1(t)V(t, t) + F1(t)V1(t, t)}/f1(t), for
t ≤ tm. Indeed, it is easily verified that Ω1(t, t) > 0, whereas
−Ψ1(t,t) −Λg[1−F1(t)]F1(t)V1(t,t) +Λg[2F1(t)−1] f1(t)V(t,t)
can only be positive if F1(t) > 0.5.
Claim (ii) We derive a condition for when the highest type
bids more aggressively under loss aversion with Λm  0 than
under risk neutrality. Because the difference in these two bids
is continuous in the type and in Λm, whenever this condition
is satisfied for the highest type, there exist two thresholds, t′
and Λ̂m > 0, such that for Λm < Λ̂m, every t ∈ [t′, t̄] bids more
aggressively than under risk neutrality.
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Note that for Λm  0, (A.9) is satisfied with equality. Thus,
the highest type overbids relative to risk neutrality if and only
if −Ψ1(t̄, t̄) > Ω1(t̄, t̄). □
Proof of Proposition 11. The envelope theorem implies
that, in both auction formats, EU(t, t)  ∫ tt [F1(s)V2(s, s) −
Ψ2(s, s)− Ω2(s, s)]ds, which proves the first statement. More-
over, in equilibrium, we have the following:




F1 s( )V2 s, s( ) −Ψ2 s, s( ) −Ω2 s, s( )[ ]ds,
where k ∈ {I, II}. Therefore, 7I  7II :7. Moreover, notice






7 t( )  1 + Λm 1 − F1 t( )[ ]{ } × F1 t( )β∗I t( ) and
7 t( )  1 + Λm 1 − F1 t( )[ ]{ }
∫ t
t
β∗II s( ) f1 s( )ds + ΛmI t( ) ,





II(s)f1(s)ds if Λm  0. Next, let Λm > 0. As I(t) > 0





Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose first that ηm  0. Then, it is
easy to see that for every t > t, in each auction format, the bid
in the PPE is larger than that under CPE because −Ψ̃1(t, t) >
−Ψ1(t, t) and −Ω̃1(t, t) > −Ω1(t, t). This claim can be verified
by using the representation of the direct utilities in (A.1) and
in (A.7). Because both bidding functions are continuous in ηm,
the stated result follows. □
Proof of Proposition 13. Recall that v(ti, t−i) is the buyer’s
valuation. Define ṽ(ti, t−i) : ug(v(ti, t−i)), where ug : R+ → R+
is a monotone transformation. Similarly, let um : R+ → R+ be
a monotone transformation of the (ex post) payment. Fix an
auction format k ∈ {I, II}. Substituting ṽ for v into the ex-
pression of β∗k (t) yields um (̃β∗k (t)), where β̃∗k (t) is the equilib-
rium bid under the new transformation. This bid can be
calculated as u−1m (um (̃β∗k (t))) because um is a monotone func-
tion. Then, if −Ψ̃1(t, t) > −Ψ1(t, t) and −Ω̃1(t, t) > −Ω1(t, t) for
v(ti, t−i), then the same inequalities also hold for ṽ(ti, t−i).
Thus, β̃∗k (t) is larger in the PPE than under CPE. □
Proof of Proposition 14. We begin by proving the first
statement. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by EU(t)
type-t bidders’ indirect equilibrium utility. We know that
EUCARA,CVII t( )  EUCARA,PVII t( )  EUCARA,PVI t( )
 EUCARA,CVI t( ) ,
where the first and last equalities follow from Eső and
White (2004) and the middle one follows from Matthews
(1983). Hence,
EUCARA,CVII t( )  EUCARA,CVI t( )⇔U CEII t( )( )
 U CEI t( )( )⇔CEII t( )  CEI t( ) ,
where CE is the certainty equivalent. In equilibrium—that is,
for a fixed bidding strategy βCARAk , k ∈ {I, II}—a bidder of
type ti faces a lottery over basic outcomes. Let Xtik denote the
random variable associated with this lottery in the FPA and
the SPA, respectively. For the FPA, we have that XtiI 
v(ti, t−i) − βCARAI (ti) if ti is larger than the signal of i’s strongest
opponent—that is, if ti > τ1—andXtiI  0 otherwise. Similarly,
in the SPA,we have thatXtiII  v(ti, t−i)−βCARAII (τ1) if ti > τ1, and
XtiII  0 otherwise. The FPA gives rise to more intensive risk
than the SPA if and only if Var(XtiI |XtiI > 0) ≥ Var(XtiII |XtiII > 0).
Both auction formats give rise to the same extensive risk—that
is, the probability of losing the auction is the same in both
auction formats. Therefore, Var(XtiI |XtiI > 0) ≥Var(XtiII |XtiII > 0)
if andonly ifVar(XtiI ) ≥ Var(XtiII).As thebidder’sutility function
is concave and CEII(t) CEI(t), it must be that Var(XtiI |XtiI >0)≥
Var(XtiII |XtiII >0)⇔Var(XtiI )≥Var(XtiII)⇔E[XtiI ]≥E[XtiII]; hence,
E[βCARAII (τ1)] ≥ E[βCARAI (t)]. Finally, as a bidder’s expected
payment is higher in the auction that leads to fewer intensive
risks for any type, it follows that the seller’s expected revenue
is also higher in that auction.
Next, we turn to the last statement. For the SPA, the
result follows from Milgrom and Weber (1982). For the
FPA, we have
F1 t( )βRNI t( ) 
∫ t
t




βCARAII s( )f1 s( )ds > F1 t( )βCARAI t( ) ,
where the first inequality follows from Milgrom and
Weber (1982) and the second follows from E [βCARAII (τ1)] ≥
E [βCARAI (t)]. □
Endnotes
1The difference between CPE and UPE is reminiscent of a similar
difference between the concepts of myopic loss-aversion equilibrium
andnonmyopic loss-aversion equilibrium introduced by Shalev (2000).
2A similar implication arises in the works by Heidhues and Kőszegi
(2014) and Rosato (2016); these papers, however, only consider
posted-prices mechanisms with homogeneous buyers.
3We say that a bidder is exposed to the winner’s curse if he or she
overbids compared with the risk-neutral (Bayesian) Nash equilib-
rium. Some researchers, such as Kagel and Levin (1986) and Eyster
and Rabin (2005), use a more stringent definition: that the winning
bidder obtains a negative payoff. Yet, we think our weaker def-
inition corresponds more closely to the deviations from the risk-
neutral (and risk-averse) equilibrium, which are the main focus of
our paper.
4 In a laboratory experiment, Kocher et al. (2015) find strong evidence
for precautionary bidding. Moreover, the authors report that, al-
though their studywas inspired by Eső andWhite (2004), their results
can also be explained by loss aversion.
5The difference between our precautionary bidding effect and
the one identified by Eső and White (2004) for DARA bidders
is similar to the difference between the expected-utility-of-
wealth theories of precautionary savings that rely on prudence
and the first-order precautionary-savings motive that induces
loss-averse consumers to increase their savings in response to an
in increase in background risk; see also Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)
and Pagel (2017).
6Recent experimental evidence supports the Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006) expectations-based model of reference-dependent prefer-
ences and loss aversion; see, for instance, Abeler et al. (2011), Ericson
Marzilli and Fuster (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Karle et al. (2015),
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and Smith (2019). More pertinently, Banerji and Gupta (2014),
Eisenhuth and Grunewald (2018), and Rosato and Tymula (2019)
provide experimental support for this model in the context of
sealed-bid auctions.
7Whereas the consumption value in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) is
private and deterministic, in our model, Vi is interdependent and ex
ante unknown to the bidders. Nonetheless, we follow their model
by assuming that μk(·) is a “universal gain–loss function” so that
how a person feels about gains or losses in a dimension depends, in
a universal way, on the changes in material utility associated with
that dimension. Thus, we want to capture the idea that, when
losing an auction for an authentic Monet, the bidder experiences a
loss in the consumption dimension similar to that arising if, after
winning the auction, the bidder realizes that the painting is a cheap
imitation.
8We allow for different parameters of gain–loss utility and loss
aversion in the good and money dimensions because the two have
different implications for bidding in auctions. In particular, our
formulation is rich enough to capture situations in which bidders are
loss-averse only regarding the consumption dimension. Such a case
applies if bidders’ income is subject to large background risk, as
argued by Köszegi and Rabin (2009); in a similar vein, Novemsky and
Kahneman (2005) argue that money given up in purchases is gen-
erally not subject to loss aversion.
9As shown by Dato et al. (2017), focusing on pure-strategy equilibria
is without loss of generality under CPE.
10Assumption 1 is relevant for the derivation of the equilibrium bids
under CPE, but it is not needed under UPE; nonetheless, we maintain
it throughout the paper, as this makes it easier to compare equilib-
rium bids across the two specifications. We relax this assumption in
the web appendix, where we show that most of our results continue
to hold qualitatively. The main difference is that, if Assumption 1
does not hold, the equilibrium under CPE entails partial pooling at
the bottom, whereby some bidders bid zero in order to lose the
auction for sure and avoid any risk.
11Herweg et al. (2010) first introducedAssumption 1 and referred to it
as “no dominance of gain–loss utility.” This assumption ensures that
a loss-averse agent does not select first-order stochastically domi-
nated options; see also Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016).
12 In the proof of Proposition 1, we verify that the PPE is the UPE
where a bidder is indifferent between mimicking a higher type or
bidding according to his or her true type.
13 Following Eső and White (2004), we say that a private-value en-
vironment and an interdependent-value one are comparable if v(ti) 
h(ti) and v(ti, t−i)  h(ti)+ g(t−i) for positive and increasing functions
h(·) and g(·).
14 It is straightforward to verify that downward deviations lead to the
same equilibrium bid as the one presented in Proposition 5; see also
the discussion following Proposition 6.
15 In the web appendix, we show that loss aversion can reverse this
ranking.
16Notice that equilibrium bids are decreasing in ηm under both UPE
and CPE. Yet, bids decrease by more in the PPE than under CPE. To
see the intuition, consider bidders in the FPA whose type is close to t̄.
If they bid as if their signal were t̄, they are guaranteed to win the
auction. Under CPE, therefore, even for large values of ηm, bidders
will not suffer any losses in money, as they anticipate that they will
pay their bid for sure. Under UPE, instead, the same bidders suffer a
painful loss when winning because they pay more than expected.
Thus, loss aversion over money decreases high-type bidders’ in-
centives to bid aggressivelymore underUPE than under CPE. In turn,
these high-type bidders submit larger bids under CPE than in the PPE
if ηm is large enough.
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